Conclusion

Giving evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee in July 2004, Professor Martyn Thomas, representing the UK Computing Research Committee, said he:

This cuts to the core of the issue - if the practical implementation of the ID cards project should fail, it will not merely be a waste of taxpayers' money but a cause of major inconvenience and stress to members of the public.

The likely problems with the technology - failure to verify biometrics, lack of security of NIR data, physical failure of cards and readers - are such that the inconvenience would affect specific individuals rather than being evenly spread around the system, and would disproportionally affect particular groups of people, such as those whose physical characteristics make it difficult to register a biometric.

Neither the major contractors nor the government have shown themselves capable of organising and implementing an outsourced IT scheme on this scale. No country has attempted to create a database of the scale and type planned for the NIR, nor to use biometric technologies to register a population the size of the UK. While risks must sometimes be taken, to legislate for the use of experimental technology in the face of a rising chorus of well-informed voices calling for the project to be sent back to the drawing board seems nothing less than foolhardy. Given that there is no urgent need to introduce an ID card right now, no overwhelming internal logic for the government's particular scheme as such, and rapidly shrinking public support, can pushing on into the unknown really be justified?

One option would be to reject the proposed scheme outright and allow the government to think again. Failing that, it should not be too late to amend the scheme to protect the public from technological and organisational failures. At a legislative level, it can be argued that the simplest way to achieve this is that no-one should be forced to have or produce an ID card, or to register on the NIR, until the technologies can be shown to be sufficiently developed, secure and effective. This would mean amending the Bill to:

• remove the obligation to register on the NIR in order to renew a passport
• require new primary legislation before cards or NIR registration could be made compulsory for any section of the population
• prohibit both public and private sector bodies from requiring an ID card in any situation - i.e. ensure that other forms of identification should always be acceptable, whether to access public services or in other situations such as applying for jobs - there have been reports that some large employers are already considering requiring employees to register for ID cards.

These amendments would ensure, in effect, a 'market' situation for ID cards - as with most other new technologies, individuals would adopt them as they personally saw fit - i.e. at the point at which the benefits of having a card outweighed the costs - whether those costs are financial, practical or worries about security and civil liberties. Those who feel that for them personally the costs continue to outweigh the benefits would not be compelled to obtain a card for someone else's convenience. If the system could be made to work, it could then be expanded as necessary at a future date.

References
58 - Home Affairs Select Committee report 'Identity Cards' paragraph 214 6/7/04 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmhaff/130/13002.htm